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Recent Decisions

1975

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS-

STATE IMPLE-

MENTATION PLANS-POSTPONEMENTS-REVISIONS-The

United States

Supreme Court has held that individual variances from a state's
implementation plan which do not violate national ambient air
standards are permissible as "revisions," rather than
"postponements," under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60
(1975).
In response to heightened public concern over the quality of ambient air' in the 1960's, Congress passed a series of laws designed to
stimulate promulgation and enforcement of air quality standards.2
The first acts placed primary responsibility for air quality control
upon the states: they were given wide discretion on how and when
to act and the role of the federal government was severely limited.'
Most states failed to exercise their discretion, forcing stronger federal legislation which demanded certain state action in the field of
air pollution control. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19704 called
for formulation of national ambient air quality standards5 by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The states were obliged

to submit plans for the implementation of these standards within
1.

"Ambient air" is the statutory term used to describe the air which surrounds us. See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrIoNARY 66 (unabr. ed.

42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970);

1966).
2. Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857, a, b, c, d, e,
f (1970) authorized the Surgeon General to study the problem and to provide technical
assistance to the states. The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (1970) authorized federal authorities to intervene directly to
abate interstate pollution in certain circumstances. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 103, 79 Stat. 996, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1857b (1970) and Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1857c(a)
(1970) somewhat broadened federal authority. The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970) gave federal authorities certain
enforcement and supervision powers.
3. See, e.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970).
4. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57h (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as the Amendments].
5. Id. § 1857c-4(a)(1). "Primary standards" are those requisite to protect the public
health. Id. § 1857c-4(b)(1). "Secondary standards" are those "requisite to protect the public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such
pollutant in the ambient air." Id. § 1857c-4(b)(2). Primary standards must be obtained "as
expeditiously as practicable but . . . in no case later than three years from the date of
approval of [an implementation] plan." Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i). Secondary standards must
be obtained within a "reasonable time." Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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nine months of their promulgation.6
In its plan for attainment of the national standards, the state of
Georgia provided for enforcement of its emissions limitations prior
to the final attainment date set by the Amendments.7 To temper
this rigid requirement, the Georgia plan contained a "variance"
procedure' whereby the state agency could exempt an individual
emissions source from the plan's generally applicable requirements
if strict compliance would be unreasonable, unduly burdensome or
impractical.' The EPA approved the Georgia plan because the
6. The Amendments' overall scheme is two-tiered. After the EPA promulgated the national air quality standards, each state adopted an implementation plan tailored to its special
needs and containing compliance schedules, timetables and the stringent emissions limitations necessary to comply with the national standards. Under this system, an individual
source complies with the particular emissions limitations set by the state rather than with
the national standards themselves. Violation of the emissions standards renders a source
subject to legal action by the state agency. Id. § 1857c-5(a).
The Amendments' strength lies in provisions imposing stringent deadlines for the attainment of national ambient air quality standards. The Amendments require EPA approval of
a state implementation plan if, inter alia, it provides for attainment of national primary
standards as expeditiously as practicable-but in no case may attainment be later than three
years from the date of the EPA's approval of the plan. See note 5 supra. The Amendments
empower the EPA to formulate an implementation plan on a state's behalf if it neglects to
do so or fails to plan adequately for the attainment of national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c5(c) (1970). See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub
nom., Exxon Corp. v. EPA, 44 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1975) (No. 324).
7. The Amendments do not require compliance with the national standards until the
mandatory attainment date, which in most states was July, 1975; there are no statutory
guidelines as to a state's application of emissions limitations prior to that date. Generally,
the states either completely forgo enforcement of emissions limitations before the attainment
date or they impose the limitations as soon as their plans have been approved. The EPA
prefers the latter approach, although it creates a problem for some sources which may be
unable to comply with the limitations immediately despite good faith efforts. Under very
limited circumstances, the Amendments aid such good faith violators by allowing one-year
"postponements" of any requirement of a state implementation plan. A postponement may
be granted only to a source whose continued operation is essential to national security or the
public welfare, and whose good faith attempt to comply has failed due to unavailable technology. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). In addition, the Amendments require EPA approval of a
"revision" of a plan, provided the plan still complies with the statutory requirements. Id.
§ 1857c-5(a)(3).
8. The term "variance" does not appear in the Amendments. Many state plans use the
word, usually in reference to a change in emissions limitations mix.
9. The Georgia Act provided in part:
The department may grant specific or general classes of variances from the particular requirements of any rule . . . because of special circumstances which would render
strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impractical . ...
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 88-912 (1971).
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agency's interpretative regulation'0 on the "revision" section" permitted the revision of a state plan provided the plan would still meet
the national standards."
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an environmental organization, sought judicial review of the agency's decision
in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 3 The issue was whether
individual variances should be treated as "revisions" or "postponements" under the Amendments. NRDC contended that individual
variances might be approved only if they met the stringent conditions governing postponements. 4 The court agreed and ordered the
agency to disapprove the Georgia plan, holding that the postponement section was the exclusive method by which a state could grant
individual variances. 5
In the court's view, a variance granted to an individual emissions
source could not be classified as a revision, which would be a change
in a generally applicable requirement; rather, the variance would be
a postponement-a change in the application of a requirement to a
particular party."8 There was no room in this analysis for the
agency's contention that the real distinction between "postponement" and "revision" depended on whether the variance would af7
fect attainment of a national standard.
The court thought the legislative strategy behind the Amendments precluded state-supplied pre-attainment flexibility in the
form of variances. The Amendments required ambitious commitments which should not be altered once a state's plan had been
approved. The three-year time limit on compliance was evidence
that Congress did not expect immediate attainment of air quality
standards; it was not, however, a dispensation to individual sources
from immediate compliance with the emissions limitations as they
10. An interpretative regulation is an agency's construction of statutory language. In most
circumstances it does not have the force of law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 5.03
(3d ed. 1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2),(3) (1970).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 51.32(f) (1974).
13. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). See note 7 supra.
15. 489 F.2d at 401-03. The requirements of the Georgia plan were far less stringent and
therefore did not comply with the Amendments.
16. Id.
17. Id. The EPA's position was based on its own interpretation of the revision section. See
text at notes 10-12 supra.
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fell due under a state plan.' 8 The EPA appealed this interpretation
of the postponement and revision sections to the Supreme Court.'9
The Court began its analysis of the legislation by inquiring
whether Congress intended the states to retain their former significant control over the manner in which they were to achieve and
maintain national standards. The Court was easily satisfied that the
Amendments gave the states primary responsibility for determining
and enforcing the specific source-by-source emissions limitations
within their borders,"0 and that. the revision section was the device
to be used by the states in developing such policy choices." The
postponement section was a safety valve by which the EPA could
grant exceptions to the national standards themselves, rather than
a means by which the agency should monitor state emissions limitations. The Court concluded "that the Agency's interpretation was
'correct,' to the extent . . . that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute. . . is the 'correct' one."" Since the EPA had been
18. 489 F.2d at 403.
19. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). The Court's
opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist; Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. Justice
Powell took no part in the consideration of the case.
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id. The fact the EPA must approve any revision of an implementation plan, provided
it meets the requirements of the Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970), gives the
states leeway in enforcing the source-by-source limitations and determining the mix of pollutants within the bounds of the national standards. 421 U.S. at 79.
22. 421 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court discussed the divergent results reached by the
circuit courts that had considered the problem presented in Train. The First Circuit had held
that Congress intended the postponement provision as the sole mechanism for relief from the
national standards after the mandatory attainment date. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973). A state could, however, grant variances during the
pre-attainment period. Although the statute did not specifically so provide, the court believed
the Amendments anticipated greater flexibility during pre-attainment, since initially a
source might be unable to meet the state's emissions limitations. Id. at 887. This reasoning
was followed by the Second and Eighth Circuits. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d
690 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Ninth Circuit agreed that flexibility was necessary, not only in the pre-attainment
period but during post-attainment as well. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974). The court saw evidence in the legislative history that the
postponement section should apply only in cases where a particular variance would prevent
attainment or maintenance of a national standard. Id. at 912. Yet the opinion went on to say
that the EPA's revision authority was not the proper basis for allowance of state variance
procedures. The court upheld the variance provisions nonetheless because, as the First Circuit
had suggested, a proper interpretation of the Amendments included an element of flexibility.
Id. at 915 n.17.
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charged with the administration of the statute, 3 the court of appeals
should have deferred to the agency's reasonable interpretation. 4 In
support of its position, the Court looked to the legislative history,
internal logic and language of the statutory provisions.
A review of the legislative history" revealed that the proposed
Senate version of the current postponement section delayed expiration of the period for attainment of ambient air quality established
by the national standards." The Court believed this earlier draft
allowed relief from the imposition of the national standards themselves, particularly in light of the Conference Committee report27
which explained that further modification of the Senate proposal
affected the method of granting deferrals" but did not make the
postponement mechanism the exclusive variance procedure. The
Court concluded that the postponement section, like its predecessor, referred only to relief from imposition of the national standards .5
A holding that variances could be permitted only as postponements would contradict the logical scheme the Court perceived in
the Amendments. In addition to the provisions for postponements
and revisions, the statute empowered the Administrator to grant a
two-year "extension" of the period for attainment of national standards on a showing of need substantially less than required for a
one-year postponement.30 The Court reasoned that if the postponement section were the sole means of granting a variance, it would
be easier for a state to delay attainment of the national standards
than to effect a change in an emissions limitations mix which did
not interfere with attainment of the standards themselves. The
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857g(a)-h(a) (1970).
24. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (when an agency is charged with administration
of a statute, the Court will give great deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute);
McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477 (1921) (agency's practical and consistent construction of
a statute fairly susceptible of different meanings will not be disturbed except for compelling
reasons).
25. 421 U.S. at 75-87.
26. The earlier draft of the postponement section permitted the governor of a state to
petition a three-judge panel in federal district court for relief from the effects of expiration of
the attainment period. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (f) (1970).
27. H.R. REP. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 45 (1970).
28. The Senate version was modified by the Conference Committee to permit extensions
by the Administrator rather than by a three-judge federal district court. Id.
29. 421 U.S. at 84.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970).
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Court resolved the apparent disparity by determining the two-year
extension could be conferred only once and only during the preattainment period, while a postponement would be availabile anytime the applicable requirements were met." A comparison of these
two sections supported the proposition that the postponement section was not the sole means by which individual variances might be
granted.
Like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court examined.the plain
language of the statute. The Court disagreed, however, with the
lower court's characterization of revisions and postponements." In
the Court's view, a "revision" would change an applicable requirement; a "postponement" would delay the applicability of the requirement without changing its substance. 3 In any event, the temptation to engage in abstract semantics detracted from the more
relevant inquiry into the actual effect of the proposed variance.
Compliance with the national standards was the touchstone for determining whether the postponement section applied; if a proposed
emissions variance would interfere with attainment or maintenance
of a national standard, it could be granted only as a postponement.34
Train is significant not only as the first Supreme Court case dealing with the Clean Air Act Amendments, but also as an indicator
of the Court's posture in future cases concerning the Amendments.
The Train decision raises several questions which will, no doubt,
culminate in further argument before the Court. One obvious con31. The Court observed that the language of the postponement section might permit a
number of successive one-year postponements, but withheld comment. 421 U.S. at 85-86 n.21.
32. The lower court had defined "revision" as a change in a generally applicable requirement; a "postponement" was defined as a change in the application of a requirement to a
particular party. 489 F.2d at 401. The Court rejected this distinction because the Amendments required that state implementation plans contain compliance tables, schedules and
other very detailed items; revisions could, therefore, be of very specific application. 421 U.S.
at 88-89.
33. Under a postponement, an emissions source would still be responsible for compliance
with a state requirement within one year. Under an individual variance, compliance might
no longer be required and a postponement would be unnecessary.
34. The respondents had also urged that the EPA's interpretation of the revision section
invited increased litigation on whether, in each case, a variance would cause violation of the
national standards. The Court noted that the agency was unconcerned about potential administrative problems, possibly because evaluations of applications for individual variances
were similar to those made when the plans were initially approved. Any litigation, moreover,
would be carried out on the polluter's time; during the litigation the original regulations
would remain in effect, subjecting the polluter to enforcement proceedings for any violation.
These considerations would deter frivolous suits. 421 U.S. at 92.
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cern for potential litigants is the scope of the Court's review of EPA
determinations. Generally, statutory interpretation is considered
within the exclusive competence of the Court, which will construe
the language without reference to the agency's prior determination.15 In cases involving the administration of a complex statute in
a highly technical field, however, the Court may defer to the
agency's expertise and adopt the agency's reading of the statute,
provided it is reasonable.3 6 Although the Court's extensive examination of the legislative history and purpose of the Amendments in
Train appears at first glance to constitute an independent scope of
review, the Court's reluctance to endorse the agency's interpretation
as the correct, rather than a reasonable, reading37 indicates the exercise of a more limited scope of review. Train may herald the Court's
tentative recognition of the EPA's expertise and a willingness to
defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the Amendments
in the future.38
The decision also raises a question as to the applicability and
effect of the "as expeditiously as practicable" clause. 9 As a consequence of Train, a variance granted under the revision section may
not be challenged on grounds that it does not permit attainment of
the standards as quickly as possible. Presumably, the state has
attained the national standards or expects to do so despite the individual variance; in either case, the variance would have no adverse
effect upon the state's effort at compliance. NRDC had argued that
prior to the attainment date, the "as expeditiously as practicable"
clause required the maximum available controls on all sources. A
variance of any kind would delay attainment beyond the earliest
practicable date; hence variances should not be freely given.4" The
argument applied with equal force to states whose mandatory
35. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 115 (1944) (issue whether newsboys
are "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act).
36. E.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (agency charged with administration of
Bituminous Coal Act may determine who is a "producer" under the Act). See Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955); Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the
Scope of Review, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1955).
37. 421 U.S. at 75.
38. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970).
40. 412 U.S. at 94-96.
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deadline had passed but which had failed to meet the standards.41
They would still be required to comply as expeditiously as practicable. " Yet in de-emphasizing the technology-forcing aspect of the
Amendments,4 3 the Court may have diluted the statute's urgency
with regard to compliance."
Train also demonstrates the Court's view of the federal role in air
pollution control under the Amendments. The Court believed the
Amendments withdrew the states' former discretion to act to improve the ambient air; the Amendments preserved that discretion,
however, with regard to what the states may require of emissions
sources, within the parameters of the national standards.45 As a
result of Train, individual sources are more likely to request and
receive variances, and in this sense the decision affects the entire
air quality control effort. The federal agency is to guide the undertaking by setting threshold standards for state participation." The
primary responsibility, however, is now clearly on the states.
John Anthony Fries
41. 6. ENV. REP. 305 (June 6, 1975). For most states, the deadline has already passed. See
note 7 supra.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970).
43. NRDC had argued that the Amendments were technology-forcing, since attainment
of the national standards might require development of new methods and devices for limiting
emissions. It would defeat the purpose of the statute, therefore, if sources granted variances
were permitted to relax their pursuit of more advanced technology. The Court found, however, that if the national standards were being met there would be no need for additional or
more efficient pollution control devices. 421 U.S. at 90-91.
44. The Court acknowledged that the Amendments required compliance as soon as practicable, but did not consider this specific question. 421 U.S. at 77 n.15.
45. The states may enforce limitations designed to achieve a higher level of air quality
than approved by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
46. 421 U.S. at 67, 79.

